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Abstract
On the basis of a world matrix of international trade in major-
conventional weapons for 1985, a comparison is made between the
regional structure of arms trade and the regional structure of
trade in civilian goods from a comparable technological back-
ground. It turns out that there are striking divergencies be-
tween both kinds of trade structures, even within military al-
liances. These divergencies are then captured by an indicator
which is named "revealed political preference" (RPP). It is ar-
gued that introducing a free-trade regime within NATO and other
industrialised western countries would make arms trade in-
crease, and, in particular, make the shares of Japan and West
Germany in arms exports rise manifold, thereby raising world
economic welfare.
It is suggested that different hypotheses for explaining world
arms-trade structures are relevant according to the region
analysed, like the trading-with-the-enemy hypothesis with
respect to the arms trade between advanced and less-developed
countries, or the military-industrial-complex hypothesis for
arms trade within alliances.- 1 -
International Arms Trade: Revealed Political Preferences
or Cartel Behaviour*
1. Outline
1. Trade in arms is different from trade in civilian goods
and services. The main distinguishing feature is that arms-
exporting countries must be aware of the "trading-with-the-
enemy" risk. At the same time, the importing country faces
the risk of being cut off from additional supplies or from
the supply of spare parts in cases of emergency. Both kinds
of risks are not necessarily symmetrical; supplying a poten-
tial enemy with weapons can obviously be more detrimental to
national security than buying from a potential enemy. Arms
exports, therefore, tend to be under close governmental sur-
veillance for external security reasons, whereas imports of
weapons are merely under control for internal security rea-
sons like any domestic arms trade (with governments claiming
the legal monopoly to exert violence within national boun-
daries) .
2. Foreign trade in civilian goods is generally not subject
to comparable controls. In fact, the communis opinio as well
as the legal framework of international trade provide for an
unrestricted international exchange of goods. The idea be-
*The paper is part of a project on "Armament, Space Pro-
grammes and Economic Development" supported by the Fritz
Thyssen Stiftung.
The authors would like to thank their colleagues Juergen B.
Donges and Fiona Short for their helpful suggestions.- 2 -
hind this liberal stance is that free trade maximises the
welfare of all trading countries. However, when introducing
the arguments of external and internal security, the classi-
cal free-trade approach becomes far more complicated, not
only due to the existence of military goods: many civilian
goods can likewise be used for military ends - e. g., com-
bustion engines; apart from such "dual goods", one might
mention the wide range of "dual technologies", i.e., dual
know-how, which improves the technological standard of the
importing country (an example being computer-assisted logis-
tics) . Basically, even the export of a truly civilian good
enables the importing country to divert scarce resources
towards military production. Gains from trade, however, also
accrue to the exporting country. Therefore, the effects on
both countries' national security should, by and large, be
balanced, such that trade with purely civilian goods under
normal (peaceful) circumstances is not regarded as an exemp-
tion to the standard free-trade argument. This means that
problems of compatibility between the (liberal) internation-
al trading order and the requirements of national security
are confined to trade with strictly military goods and to
trade with dual goods and dual technologies.
3. Using the results of trade, i.e., trade statistics, as an
indicator of production costs differentials across coun-
tries, as postulated by Ricardo, has become common practice
in empirical economics today. According to the concept of- 3 -
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) , the actual trade
structures of countries reflect the product structures of
2
their ability to compete on world markets . A country ex-
porting certain kinds of products, relative to other pro-
ducts, more successfully than other countries is said to
possess a comparative cost advantage in this line of produc-
tion. Naively applying this concept can and has been criti-
cised . In case trade flows are distorted by market inter-
ventions, the information provided by the RCA measure be-
comes distorted, too. This can be expected to be particular-
ly true when measuring comparative advantage in producing
military products. In fact, under certain conditions, which
will be stated below, the observed differentials between the
RCA index for military goods and the RCA index for civilian
goods produced under equivalent technological conditions can
lead to a new index which will be named the "revealed poli-
Bela Balassa, "Trade Liberalization and 'Revealed' Compa-
rative Advantage". In: The Manchester School of Economic
and Social Studies, Manchester, Vol. 33 (1965), pp.99-123.
2
A crucial assumption of RCA analysis is that the impact on
trade flows of international differences in preferences
does not distort this indicator of relative cost struc-
tures. As can be shown, the indicator is rather robust in
this respect except from really extreme constellations.
Compare the seminal study by Wassily Leontief, "The Use of
Indifference Curves in the Analysis of Foreign Trade". In:
W. Leontief, Essays in Economics, Theories and Theorizing,
Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1966, pp.
116-125 (Reprint from: The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 47 (1933), pp. 493-503).
For a theoretical discussion of RCAs see e.g., Arye L.
Hillman,"'Revealed Comparative Advantage' and Comparative
Advantage as Indicated by Pre-Trade Relative Prices". In:
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 116, 1980, pp. 315-321,
Harry P. Bowen, "On Measuring Comparative Advantage: Fur-
ther Comments". In: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 122,
1986, pp. 379-381, and the literature quoted therein.- 4 -
tical preference".
4. In the next section we describe the concept of "revealed
political preference", state the empirical requirements for
constructing such a measure, and then present the world ma-
trix of international trade in major conventional weapons in
comparison to the same matrix for comparable civilian
goods.
In the third section, it is discussed whether the observed
structural differences can be explained by conventional mar-
ket structure/conduct models, or by models referring to an
analogy between military alliances and cartels. The final
conclusions are concerned with conjectures which stress the
relevance of basically non-economic factors in explaining
revealed political preference.
2. Emgirical_Evidence
a. The Concept of "Revealed Political Preference"
5. The "revealed political preference" (RPP) will be defined
as the difference between two indexes of "revealed compara-
tive advantage" (RCA), one for military goods and one for
civilian goods, which are supposed to be produced under the
same cost conditions:- 5 -
RPP?
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RPP. < 0 means political discrimination of arms exports of
country i (RPP = -1 reflecting maximum political
discrimination).
RPP. > 0 indicates political promotion of arms exports of
country i.
RPP. = 0 refers to the absence of observed political pref-
erences.
The same formula and interpretation of results holds true
for RPP. , i.e., for a comparison of import structures. The
index does not reflect whether the source of political pref-
erences is with the home country or with the foreign coun-
tries.
6. Drawing conclusions from the RPP indicator would in par-
ticular require that:- 6 -
- the elasticity of substitution of military goods for
civilian goods is zero. That is to say, regulations of
arms trade do not affect trade in civilian goods;
- the quality standards and technological sophistication
between the two baskets of goods do not differ;
- the RCA measure for the civilian products is not distorted
by trade policies at home or abroad, for instance by
tariffs or quotas;
- a country's trade in military goods is not artificially
raised or lowered by another country's interventions.
At first sight, these requirements would preclude any RPP
analysis of the real world. But when analysing trade in
strictly military goods, such as major conventional weapons,
the possibilities of substitution for civilian consumption
should indeed be nearly zero. It may be argued that, via
general interdependencies, trade regulations of one activity
affect all others as well (e.g. through distorting currency
exchange rates), but this interdependency can well be sup-
posed to be of very little importance for the RCA indicator
in civilian trade. At a first glance, the second requirement
seems to contradict the assumption of zero substitution in
consumption; it does not do so, however, because it is con-
cerned with production possibilities, i.e., with marginal
rates of transformation between the production of weapons
and of civilian goods (not with marginal rates of substitu-
tion) . Taking all those engeneering products traded under
the SITC 7 heading - "Machinery and Transport Equipment"
as a proxy for the "civilian goods" should guarantee the- 7 -
possibility of almost perfect conversion in factor use be-
tween civilian products and major conventional weapons. The
third requirement is concerned with matters of fact. The
literature seems not to be controversial in that trade bar-
riers are less important in the SITC 7 field ; on the other
hand, trade as well as the production of major conventional
weapons is under tight government control. Finally, the RPP
index does not reveal the source of political preference.
For instance, RPP < 0 can be due to voluntary export res-
traints of the producing country, or to import protection of
the potential importing countries, or to both. This would
say that interpretation of country results should indeed
take the results achieved for other countries simultaneously
into account.
b. Arms Trade Structures
7. The regional structure of world arms trade is not readily
available. The world matrix of trade in major conventional
weapons has been compiled by giving each transaction in a
certain weapon the same weight ("transaction" referring to
contracts or deliveries made in 1985; see the notes to Table
1) - independent from the number of weapons and from the va-
Trade barriers in the form of tariffs are lowest in SITC 7
as compared to other industrial products. Non-tariff trade
barriers are most important in sectors such as textiles,
clothing (SITCs 6 and 8), and agricultural products (SITC
0, 1 and 4). Since there is one major sector besides SITC
7 - namely chemicals (SITC 5) - whose protection is below
average, the above-mentioned exchange rate effects should
be negligible. Compare Shailendra J. Aniaria, Naheed
Kirmani, Arne B. Petersen, Trade Policy Issues and Deve-
lopments. IMF Occasional Paper No. 38, Washington D.C.,
July 1985, and the literature quoted therein.- 8 -
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The first figure refers to the Share of the region in total supply of the respective exporter; the figure in brackets refers to the saie share regarding trade in
licences for arts production. - On the basis of the nuiber of transactions Kith ujor conventional weapons (actual delireries plus orders in 1985). -
 cFrance is a
contracting party to NATO but not part of the integrated lilitary couand structure. - Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sneden, South Africa, SnitierUnd, Yugoslavia. -
Australia, Japan, NeH Zealand.
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ISIPRI), Vorld Anatent and Disariaeent - SIPRI Yearbook 1986, Oxford, Ken York 19B6. - Authors' compilations and
calculations.- 9 -
lue of the transaction (Table 1) . The underlying hypothesis
is that, in the case of the number of notifications being
large enough, the errors tend to be small. For some figures
in Table 1, a comparison with value-based trade statistics
is possible, namely with figures concerning the regional
share of arms exports to less-developed countries; such .a
comparison reveals striking congruencies: the shares of arms
exports to LDCs in the case of the FRG, USSR and LDCs them-
selves (intra-regional trade) are 61.6 per cent; 80.5 per
cent; 95.4 per cent - according to Table 1 the figures are:
2
59.4 per cent; 80.4 per cent; 95.8 per cent . Systematic de-
viations exist with respect to the regional structure of
supply, where the big suppliers, the USSR and the USt exhib-
it relatively small shares in Table .1 (last column). This
would say that these two countries realize a larger unit
value per contract or delivery .
8. Even when allowing for the inherent limitations of the
fact-finding process, the world trade matrix reveals that
For example: the delivery of one E-2C Hawkeye (airborne
early warning system) from the US to Egypt in 1985 (value:
U.S. $ 175 mill.) has been given the same weight as the
delivery of probably ninety-six AM-39 Exocet missiles from
France to Iraq (no price information available).
2
Or: In Udis the information is given that the value share
of West Germany in world arms trade between 1979 and 1983
was 3.91 per cent (in Table 1: 3.6 per cent) etc. Compare
Bernard Udis, "The High Technology Arms Race: The West Eu-
ropean Case". In: Conflict Management and Peace Science,
Vol. 9, No. 1, Fall 1985, pp. 19-31. Udis gives reference
to estimates in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington
D.C. 1985, Table III, pp. 131-134.
See SIPRI, Yearbook 1986, pp. 324 and 338 for data on the
country structure of world arms exports.- 10 -
arms trade within each of the two big military alliances is
of a lesser magnitude than one might expect: the share of
intra-alliance trade is 18.4 per cent in the case of NATO,
and 16.5 per cent in the case of the Warsaw Pact. In addi-
tion:
- the main industrial countries, and the USSR, imported very
few heavy conventional weapons, not even from the member
countries of the respective alliance;
- NATO is different from Warsaw Pact countries in that the
supply of the former is not left almost exclusively to the
leading country ;
- the main export markets of all countries considered are
the less-developed countries; for instance almost 90 per
cent of France's arms exports go to LDCs (USSR: 80 per
cent) .
9. Table 1 also provides a compilation of trade in licenses.
Such trade can be considered a substitute for trade in pro-
ducts, though not a perfect one: licence production normally
takes more time than directly importing - i.e., may come too
See also NATO Information Service, NATO and the Warsaw
Pact - Force Comparisons, Brussels 1984, where emphasis is
given to severe differences between the alliances regard-
ing transport costs (which are supposedly higher among
NATO members). Ibidem, p.4.
2
For an in-depth analysis of arms trade with the third
world, see e.g., Robert W. Clawson, East-Western Rivalry
in the Third World. Security Issues and Regional Perspec-
tives. SR, Wilmington (Del.) 1986, or Christopher Coker,
NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa. Macmillan, London 1985.- 11 -
late - and it takes more indigenous know-how. The advantage
of licence production is on the other hand that the recipi-
ent country in the long run becomes less dependent on for-
eign arms supply. It can be expected that, in periods of ac-
tual international conflicts of a country, the short-run de-
mand for military hardware is high relative to the demand
for software. Longer lasting periods of peace may give trade
in military software a competitive edge. Though one should
be cautious to avoid an interpretative overkill, Table 1
would also suggest that:
- the two alliances as well as their member countries (ex-
ception: the United States) internally prefer trade with
arms licences to trade with arms;
- the less-developed countries prefer weapons imports to the
knowledge of how to produce them.
This is reflected in the relationships between the alliances
and less-developed countries: both alliances co-operate less
with LDCs regarding indigenous arms production than could be
expected in view of the volume of arms trade - the FRG is a
significant exception to this pattern.
c. Overall Revealed Political Preferences
10. International trade in commodities for which the tech-
niques and costs of production are similar to those of heavy
weapons will now be compared with arms trade (Table 2). In
cases where the trade patterns of the two are identical, the- 12 -
















































































































excluding trade between the two German states. - Including item "unspecified" in the 0ECD trade
statistics.
Source: United Nations, Statistical Office, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. XLI, February 1987
and May 1987, New York 1987. - OECD Department of Economics and Statistics, Foreign Trade by
Commodities 1985, Exports, Vol. I, and Imports, Vol. II, Paris 1987. - Own calculations.
above discussion and qualifications would imply that there
are no apparent policy-induced distortions.
Comparison between Tables 1 and 2 reveals that there are
great differences between "civilian" and "military" trade
patterns: this holds particularly true for the intra-trade
patterns of developed market economies, of Comecon coun-
tries, and of less-developed countries . Civilian intra-
The "non-aligned" and the "other" industrial countries of
Table 1 are part of the "developed-market" economies of
Table 2. The resulting bias regarding the above compari-
sons is of only little importance, as Table 1 suggests.BibJiofhek
des I nsfftuts fur Weffwf rtschaft
- 13 -
trade is about four times as high as the arms intra-trade in
the first two regions; in the intra-LDC trade case the oppo-
site is true: the share of civilian intra-trade is but one
third of arms intra-trade.
11. RPPs for major conventional weapons are shown in Table
3. They indicate that congruency of trade structures is
greater regarding total world supply (last column in Tables
1 and 2) than world demand (last row in Tables 1 and 2).
Table 3:•Congruency of World Exports (World Imports) of Arms
versus Comparable Civilian Exports (Imports)








Ratio of total arms export (import) shares to total exports
(imports) of SITC 7 products minus one. - NATO plus non-
aligned plus other industrial countries.















Structural identity would imply that the ratios of military
to civil supply (or demand respectively) would be unity and
thus RPPs would equal zero. By and large, this is true in
the case of supply of developed-market economies, and of
LDCs; no such congruency can be identified on the import
side; less-developed countries import only a small fraction
of what could be expected from civilian imports, and less-
developed countries import more than three times as many
weapons relative to other countries than non-military goods.
The seemingly high congruency of developed countries' world
market shares in military relative to civilian products is,
as Table 3 indicates, a statistical artefact: some countries
- such as the US, France, and the UK - have a coefficient
well above zero; the FRG and, not shown in Table 3, Japan
have a very low coefficient - in fact Japan virtually does
not export major conventional weapons at all. The median po-
sition is hardly represented.
12. The results suggest that political preferences are in-
deed a dominating feature of internaternational arms trade.
The impression comes out quite clearly that arms trade is
typically marked by mercantilism: all countries which are
leading in arms exports seem to discriminate heavily against
foreign suppliers. Secondly, most of the arms exporting
countries exhibit a high degree of specialisation in their
export basket towards military goods. Thirdly, the index of
political preferences indicates that the FRG's (and, not- 15 -
shown in Table 3, Japan's) arms exports are discriminated
against; it does not come out, yet, whether this is a conse-
quence of political self-restraint or part of the preferen-
ces of potential customers. Fourthly, less-developed coun-
tries exhibit strong political preferences for importing
weapons rather than civilian engineering products. Finally,
import discrimination as defined above is strong as a rule,
and almost perfectly so in the case of France and the US.
This raises the question of intra-alliance RPPs.
d. RPPs within NATO
13. It has been said that RPP for intra-alliance trade can
be expected to be positive for the simple non-economic rea-
son that mutual trust - should alliances make any sense at
all - is greater under alliance conditions than without the
alliance. The evidence with respect to some of the larger
NATO member states is compiled in Table 4. It shows that
Table 4: RPP Indices





























As described in Table 3. - Contracting party to NATO but
not part of the integrated military command structure.
Source: Calculated from Tables 1 and 2.- 16 -
there is no preferential treatment of arms trade among the
NATO countries considered. In fact, the negative coeffi-
cients indicate almost maximum mutual discrimination . The
division of labour in military products is much less de-
veloped than even sheer neutrality cum economic interest
would suggest.
3. MilitarY_Alliances2_A_Case_of_Mutual_Trust?_
14. A remarkable result of the preceding section is the low
intensity of arms trade within the two military alliances.
This poses the question about the implications which the
existence of an alliance has on measured RPP indices of mem-
ber states. Firstly, the RCA index on which RPP is based
should refer to markets not distorted by any kind of govern-
ment intervention. Since alliances are, by their very exist-
ence, an intervention, the question has to be analysed
whether there are economic reasons why RCAs can be expected
to differ due to the market conditions created by the alli-
ance. Secondly, the a priori assumption would be that since
alliances by their very nature reflect preferences among
countries, the RPP of arms trade within the alliance should
be positive.
Total maximum discrimination would give, when adding up
the coefficients in Table 4, the sum of -12. Actually, the
sum is -9.9 (i.e., 83 per cent of maximum discrimination).- 17 -
15. At a first glance, there is no special risk involved in
exporting or importing military goods within a military al-
liance - this is the very essence of an alliance which rests
on mutual trust among member countries, and on collective
support in cases of third countries' aggression; trust quite
obviously would include non-proliferation of arms and know-
how to third parties. Put differently, within an alliance
there are no security constraints to the case for internal
free trade: each member country's welfare is served best by
an allocation of resources which leaves the production of
civilian as well as of military goods with the most effi-
cient producer. "Free trade" describes a scenario in which
there is competition among buyers and among sellers, and
where market performance is not influenced by the production
and trade-specific interventions of governments.
16. However, the real world is different . Mutual trust and
collective action in favour of endangered partner countries
may not be the main underlying forces even within alliances.
Countries continue to have their selfish interests and aims.
In other words: even as part of an alliance, each country
tends to have a national balance sheet where costs and bene-
fits of the alliance are accounted for. Most probably, an
alliance will only be stable in the long run if costs and
Gunter Kirchhoff(Hrq.). Handbuch zur Okonomie der Vertei-
digungspolitik. Praetoria Verlag, Regensburg, 1986.- 18 -
benefits for each member stay in equilibrium .
17. The crucial question then turns out to be: is there any
good reason to assume that the international production and
trade structure of military goods (and technologies) within
an alliance would be different from those structures which
could be expected if only economic criteria of competitive-
ness were to matter? The economists' profession has long
since developed models of thinking which may help to answer
this question. One model tries to explain deviations from
the "free-trade scenario" by specific structures of supply
and demand. When some market agents possess more economic
power than others, this will have an impact on the alloca-
tion of resources. Of course, this model is not a peculiari-
ty of the arms market; in fact, the same reasoning has been
applied with respect to other markets, such as automobiles,
steel or chemicals . The second model explains deviations
from "free-trade structures" by international political co-
operation, i.e., by the cartel-like behaviour of governments
concerning the provision of the public good called national
security.
Boulding argues that military alliances as such are basic-
ally non-economical, "in the sense that they do not have a
balance sheet", which seems to be no contradiction to the
above. Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Economics and Nonecono-
mics of the World War Industry". In: Contemporary Policy
Issues, Vol IV, No. 4, Oct. 1986, pp. 12-21. See also
Kal J. Holsti, "Politics in Command: Foreign Trade as Na-
tional Security Policy". In: International Organization,
Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 643-671.- 19 -
a. RCAs under Conditions of Oligopoly
18. In the first model, NATO can be regarded as resembling
either an oligopoly (with few member countries of "medium
size"), a partial oligopoly (with some "small" members and
few "medium" ones), a partial monopoly (with some "small"
members and one "big" one), or an asymmetric partial oligo-
poly (with some "small", and some "medium" members, and one
"big" one) . Most observers would subsume the western alli-
ance under the heading "asymmetric partial oligopoly", where
the United States would be the big supplier, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, and West Germany of medium size, and
probably countries as Denmark, Luxembourg, or Belgium among
the small suppliers. But no matter what the exact definition
of the NATO structure may be, the model predicts similar be-
havioural patterns. Even in the partial-monopoly case, the
big supplier cannot achieve his individual profit maximum;
he has to take into account what the others would do even if
these other parties simply accepted the conditions set by
the leading supplier.
The structure/conduct model allows for a variety in market
behaviour of the leading supplier. In the extreme case of
purely monopolistic behaviour, the monopolist - here the
United States is the leading supplier of weapons - tries to
charge higher (monopolistic) prices by supplying less quan-
See Heinrich von Stackelberq, "Die Grundlagen der Natio-
nalokonomie". In: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 51,
1940 (I), pp. 245-286.- 20 -
tities compared to the "free-trade" case. Such behaviour
would be self-defeating: too high prices would provide the
incentives for the smaller countries to take up arms produc-
tion on their own; in the end, the monopolistic position
would have been eroded, resulting in a higher number of arms
producers.
19. In reality, at least two conditions necessary for the
above scenario do not hold true: firstly, there is no "natu-
ral" monopoly of arms production; secondly, theory tells us
that a monopolist, like an oligopolist, would not charge
prices above the "entry-prevention price" - a price which
makes the home productions of potential competitors unat-
tractive, and which is well below the short-run maximum pro-
fit level. However, when considering that the technological
capability as well as factor endowments, in particular with
respect to human capital, is rather similar across industri-
al countries, then the entry-prevention price should be
close to the competitive price, otherwise there would hardly
be an entry prevented. It can be concluded, therefore, that
the structure/conduct model does not predict a basic diver-
gency regarding the international structure of production
and trade between products for military and for civilian
purposes.
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Oligopoly Theory, Entry Prevention,
and Growth.Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford, Vol. 22 (1970),
pp. 297-310.- 21 -
b. RCAs under Conditions of Cartelisation
20. The other model refers to the alliance as a cartel maxi-
mising welfare for its members. In such a cartel, decisions
are centrally planned, which may result in the closure of
inefficient plants and in profit sharing. It may also be
that, instead of the most efficient plants, the plants of
the biggest cartel members would be treated preferentially.
NATO would thus be regarded as an international cartel. In
the civilian domain, international cartels fix prices and
conditions, agree upon foreign market sharing and leave do-
mestic markets to domestic suppliers . Since NATO is a sup-
plier of security for its members (and for free riders), it
2
has different parameters of action . Let us assume here that
its raison d'etre is to supply security more cheaply than
the member countries themselves could achieve (or, in the
same vein, that it has to render more security for a certain
amount of money which member states are willing to spend).
21. The ideal of an alliance would provide the public good
"external security" common for all its members without dis-
crimination in one way or another. The parameters of action
are the quality and level of combined armaments, the common
Corvin D. Edwards, Cartelization in Western Europe. Policy
Research Study. External Research Staff, Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research, US Department of State, Washington
D. C., June 1964.
2
Mancur Olson jr. and Richard Leckhauser, "An Economic The-
ory of Alliances". In: The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, Vol. XLVIII (1966), pp. 266-279, Todd Sandier, John
F. Forbes, "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of
NATO". In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 18, 1980, pp. 425-444.- 22 -
military strategies for cases of emergency, and, thirdly,
the individual countries' contribution to the common ends.
Of course, in the case of the ideal alliance, members do not
necessarily have the same weight: if monetary contributions,
for instance, differ according to country size one would ex-
pect some equivalent distribution in the process of deci-
sion-making: even in its ideal form the alliance does not
abolish selfish national interests; voting power according
to monetary contribution does not settle free-rider problems
or disputes over burden sharing. In the formulation of stra-
tegies, the US would, e.g., aim at maximum contributions of
other NATO countries to support a strategy solely determined
by the US as the most important member . If this strategy
were "massive nuclear deterrence", however, smaller member
countries could exploit their potential of being a free ri-
der. Therefore, the US would have to change her strategy to-
wards, say, some "flexible response" solution where flexi-
2 3
bility is provided also by member countries , and so on .
Having agreed upon the parameters of action, the ideal al-
liance would buy the inputs necessary for the pursuit of se-
Michele Fratianni, John Pattison, "The Economics of Inter-
national Organizations". In: Kyklos, Vol. 35, 1982, pp.
244-262.
2
Empirical evidence for this has been established by James
C. Murdock, Todd Sandier, "Complementarity, Free Riding,
and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies". In: Journal
of Public Economics, Vol. 25, No. d/2, Nov. 1984, pp.83-
101.
Other strategies of the "big" country can likewise be ana-
lysed as having repercussions on the said strategy.- 23 -
curity from the cheapest sources possible. Again, market
structures would not play any decisive r61e, but rather the
distribution of human capital (which includes inventive and
innovative capability). The production and trade structures
would not differ basically from the above described "free-
trade" structures.
22. The concept of an ideal alliance is, of course, fiction.
National security interests are not identical for all mem-
bers; the common policy is but a compromise. Furthermore,
non-security considerations play a r61e in the formation of
national stances. The existence of a "military-industrial
complexus" in most countries, for instance, may introduce
tendencies towards national autarchy into the alliance; the
reason is that the close interrelationship in the public
procurement system between customer (administration, and the
military) and domestic arms suppliers precludes making full
use of the advantages of the international division of la-
bour . In addition, diverging histories, and national tradi-
tions of cartel members can lead to a seemingly non-economic
use of resources. One such historical instance, or national
tradition, can be seen in the differing degrees of self-re-
Sam C. Sarkesian, The Military-Industrial Complex, a Reas-
sessment. Bev. Hills (Cal.), 1972. For a recent study on
West-European Naval Industries and Defence Procurement see
S. Faltas, Arms Markets and Armament Policy. M. Nijhoff
Publishers, Dordrecht 1986. Cost aspects and efficiency
issues of the existence of the military-industrial com-
plex are discussed in William J. Weiden, Frank L.Gertcher,
The Political Economy of National Defense. Westview Press,
Boulder (Col.) 1987.- 24 -
straint of exporting countries, or - vice versa - in a tra-
ditionally strong arms export orientation of others. In
fact, international differentiation regarding prices, quan-
tities, or qualities of products has been one typical fea-
ture of international cartels .
23. All in all, NATO as an international cartel for the sup-
ply of security can be expected to exhibit an international
structure of production and trade which deviates from the
patterns of the free-trade case. The economic point of view
is thus that in two of the cases considered - "free trade"
and asymmetric partial oligopoly - the resulting structures
of NATO's arms production and trade should not differ much.
If they do differ subtantially from the "free trade" case,
the reasons can in part be sought in the peculiarities of
international cartel formation.
There may, however, be a problem of identification with res-
pect to "political" and "economic" causes for RPP ^ 0: Main
political arguments are those about the necessity of the se-
curity of supply in all matters of national defence (note
the famous phrase of Adam Smith about defence being more im-
portant than opulence ), and about the necessity to support
OECD, Export Cartels. Report of the Committee of Experts
on Restrictive Business Pratices. Paris 1974.
2
"The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the
society from the violence and invasion of other indepen-
dent societies ..." Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. The Modern Library,
New York 1965, p. 653.- 25 -
technologically-leading sectors such as the military one in
order to benefit from spin-offs and to keep up with other
countries pursuing similar objectives. At the same time,
cartels - especially when producing at high costs - need
justification in the public's eyes. Exemptions in national,
e.g., German, anti-trust laws which explicitly refer to non-
economic welfare illustrate the identification problem.
4. Conclusions
24. Even when allowing for the problems inherent in the com-
parison between major conventional weapons and products of
SITC 7, the results clearly indicate that political prefer-
ences and cartel behaviour within alliances play an impor-
tant r61e: the most striking case of trade inhibiting pref-
erences can be observed within NATO. The international divi-
sion of labour is, in economic terms, less developed and
thus less efficient than it could be. To put it differently:
major conventional weapons are more expensive than they
could be, or, the supply with civilian goods could be ex-
panded simply by restructuring world arms production and
arms trade, without reducing the overall level of world out-
put in arms. This would translate into a rise in world eco-
nomic welfare.
25. Cartel behaviour apart, a layman in military matters
would suppose that political preferences should be least re-
levant among member states of the same military alliance.- 26 -
Within a military alliance, one would expect a division of
labour which is oriented on efficiency rather than on each
members's national autarchy. It is surprising, then, that
within NATO (or within the Warsaw Pact) the structures of
arms trade indicate a very low level of internal integra-
tion. It certainly would be misleading to explain these low
levels of internal integration by surmising that the actual
arms-trade patterns within NATO (the Warsaw Pact) reflect
the comparative technological advantages of the leading
country. Such advantages should also show up regarding trade
in comparable civilian goods (here: SITC 7) - the measure of
congruency should then be near zero. This is not the case.
26. A non-economic explanation differentiates between arms
supply (exports) and demand (imports). With respect to engi-
neering products, two of the three major suppliers are Japan
and West Germany. Both countries' arms exports are low com-
pared to their potential as measured by comparable civilian
exports. Whatever the reason for this export restraint , it
strongly affects the international structure of arms supply
by increasing the world market shares of other suppliers. On
the import side, most NATO member countries effectively pre-
fer national arms production to imports - be it for national
security reasons, for promoting domestic technological pro-
gress, or due to other autarchy-directed tendencies.
For the motives of West German policies regarding arms ex-
ports, see Michael Brzoska, Riistungsexportpolitik - Len-
kung, Kontrolle und Einschrankung bundesdeutscher Rii-
stungsexporte in die dritte Welt. Arnoldshainer Schriften
zur interdisziplinaren Okonomie, Bd. 11, Frankfurt/Main
1986.- 27 -
Since export restraints have a simultaneous impact on the
import structures of other countries, and import restraints
affect the export structures of other countries, it is hard
to disentangle what causes what in international arms trade.
What it does tell us is that, in economic terms, there are
severe distortions of international intra-alliance as well
as extra-alliance arms-trade patterns.
27. All in all, it may be argued that hypotheses for ex-
plaining world arms-trade structures are different according
to the region analysed: (1) The structure of world exports
by region seems to be strongly influenced by voluntary ex-
port restraints of two of the potential biggest suppliers of
major conventional weapons besides the US, namely Japan and
West Germany. (2) Trade between developed and less-developed
countries seemingly follows the trading-with-the-enemy hypo-
thesis because there is no special risk involved for a high-
ly-developed country in exporting arms to most of the less-
developed countries. (3) Of course, the more or less non-ex-
istent trade between the two major alliances can also be ex-
plained by the trading-with-the-enemy hypothesis. (4) Intra-
alliance trade may be explained by (a) the security-of-sup-
ply argument, or (b) the spin-off argument (which here
stands for the internalisation of military R&D results and
for all the interactions relevant in the context of the "mi-
litary-industrial-complexus"); both hypotheses can likewise
express genuine political preferences or be the consequence
of cartel-like behaviour of member states.